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THE UNIT OF OFFENSE IN FEDERAL STATUTES
At the present time there is pending in the Supreme 
Court of
the United States a case involving a rather narrow 
point, but one
that has been occupying the attention of the 
Federal Courts a
great deal of late. What shall be treated as the 
"unit of offense"
under the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, the Anti-Rebate 
Act, and a
number of other Federal statutes where Congress 
has not been
specific and precise in limiting and defining the penalty?
An examination of the cases on separable offenses, 
repeating
offenses, etc., "presents contradictions quite irreconcilable," 
as
Mr. Bishop points out,
1 and there is no great help to be derived
in construing these Federal statutes from such 
general rules as
that a penal statute must be strictly construed, for 
generally there
is little or nothing to construe, and as to this 
particular rule, it
cannot be said that it is regarded with much favor 
at the present
time, either by the Courts or by the general public.
The case referred to as now pending is Baltimore 
& Ohio
Southwestern R. Co. v. U. S.,2 which comes before 
the Supreme
Court under what is known as the Twenty-Eight 
Hour Law.8
This statute provides that no carrier shall confine 
cattle in cars or
vessels for longer than twenty-eight consecutive 
hours without
unloading, except that upon the request of the owner 
or person
having charge of a particular shipment the time may 
be extended
to thirty-six hours. .The penalty imposed is "for 
every failure,"
but the act nowhere states just what is meant by 
failure, with the
natural result that the Government is contending that 
the unit of
offense is the separate shipment, and the shippers 
asserting just
as positively that it is the train, no matter of how 
many separate
shipments composed, or, at any rate, that it is something 
other
than the shipment.
The case has been once argued in the Supreme 
Court, and as
the court found itself equally divided, a motion 
for re-argument
has been granted, and the case set for October, 
19io.
The briefs of opposing counsel are interesting, but 
rest almost
entirely on statutory construction. The main argument 
of the
I Bish. New Cr. Law sec. io6i.
2 Reported below, 159 Fed., 33.
3 34 St. at L. 607.
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late Solicitor-General Bowers is to this effect: It would be im-
possible to give any reasonable interpretation to the proviso that
the owner of any particular shipment may consent to an exten-
sion to thirty-six.hours if the train were to be taken as the unit,
for that would lead to the dilemma that all shippers in the train
must consent before any shipment can be confined thirty-six
hours, or any shipper can extend the time to thirty-six hours for
all, or, finally, that although the train is the unit, part of it may
be governed by the twenty-eight hour provision and part by the
thirty-six hour provision. This argument, under the wording of
the Act, seems unanswerable, but the railroad takes this ground:
Live stock is moved by trains. Now, if this is a confinement
beyond the lawful period, then it must be the fault of the train.
Congress must have intended that the penalty should be imposed
according ta the way live stock is moved-and that is by trains,
not by shipments. The Government's answer to this line of
reasoning seems convincing: the shipment is the unit as to which
the carrier's conduct is prescribed by statute, and it must equally
be the unit of the carriers misconduct through violation of the
prescribed rule of conduct boncerning the shipment.
In the trial of this case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, the Government won its contention The Court
based its decision chiefly on the right of an individual shipper to
have the time extended to thirty-six hours. The inconvenience
to the railroad in dropping and picking up cars in order to'comply
with the law did not impress the court "as being very persuasive,
although if the matter were very doubtful it would deserve to
have some Weight." This case has 'been followed in the First
•Circuit, 5 in the Second .Circuit,6 and in the Circuit Court for the
District of Oregon.' In U. S. v. Southern Pac. Co.,s a case in
the District Court for the Northern District of California, De
Haven, D. J., charged the jury that each separate shipment con-
stituted a separate offense. Judge Landis, in U. S. v. A., T. &
S. F. Ry. Co.,' refused to consider as precedents the rulings of
other courts in the rebate cases which hail held that there were
only as many offenses as there were back payments by the rail-
road company to the shipper, stating that he did not believe the
4 i59 Fed., 33.
5 U. S. v. N. Y. C and H. R. R. Co., 165 Fed., 833.
6 U. S. v. N. Y. C. and St. L. R. Co., 169 Fed., 699.
7 U. S. v. Oregon R. and Nav. Co., 163 Fed. 642.
8 x57 Fed., 459, 463.
9 166 Fed., i6o, 164.
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Supreme Court would sanction that doctrine, and he 
decided
that each shipment was a separate offense.
These cases seem to be all the authorities under the Twenty-
Eight Hour Law, and it is believed that the Supreme Court 
will
uphold their unanimous rulings. It certainly is a grave defect 
in
a statute that in order to determine whether an offender shall 
be
liable to a fine of $1oo, or many times $oo, the Court must 
turn
to a brief proviso, not directly relating to the penalty, as the "one
salient expression upon which we can lay hold with confidence."'
0
The cases of greatest popular interest raising the question of
the unit of offense are those under the Anti-Rebate Law, the 
chief
of which is U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. The provision of 
law
which is here concerned is as follows:
"And it shall be unlawful for any person, persons, or corpora-
tion to offer, grant, or give or to solicit, accept, or receive 
any
rebate, concession or discrimination. Every person or corpora-
tion who shall offer, grant, or give or solicit, accept or receive
any such rebates, concession or discrimination shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor 
. . .tl
It may be well to enumerate the principal propositions as 
to
what is the unit of offense under this statute, as asserted by
counsel or laid down by judges, in the various Standard Oii
cases, and comment briefly on each.
(i) An agreement to give rebates for a specific period con-
stitutes one offense for all of that specific peridd.
2 This conten-
tion is easily disposed of by Judge Landis when he states that the
parties cannot limit their liability by an agreement to disregard
the law for a long period of time. Certainly it would be a strange
anomaly for the offender to have the power to "capitalize
offenses," to use a phrase of Judge Hough's,2
3 in such a manner
that the Government must wait patiently through a long series 
of
years until the illegal agreement expired before having a right
to prosecute; or else to prosecute once, and thereafter stand idly
by while the carrier continues its rebates and concessions as part
of its original offense for which, so to speak, it has made pay-
ment to the Government in advance.
(2) A separate car load. constitutes 
a separate shipment.'
4
This was the theory on which the fine of $29,24o,o0 was 
im-
10 U. S. v. B. and 0. S. W. R. Co., 159 Fed., 33, 36.
11 32 Stat. at L. 847, Sec. I.
"2Argument of defendant, 155 Fed. 305, 313.
13 U. S. v. G. N. Ry., 157 Fed., 288, 291.
14 Landis, D. J., 755 Fed., 305, 313, 314.
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posed. There seems no getting around the statement of the
Circuit Court of Appeals that the car load as the unit was "wholly
arbitrary-had no basis in any intention or fixed rule discoverable
in the statute."1 Judge Landis, in the Court below, made this
statement:
"As the Court reads this enactment, the offense is complete
whenever any property is transported at less than the lawful rate.
If this be true, the law is violated every time any property is so
transported."
Now, why should the learned Judge interpret "any property"
as meaning "car load," rather than one pound, or one gallon, or
one train load, or the total amount transported in one year? The
fact is the Act named no unit of measurement of this nature, and
any one that is laid down is simply a guess as to what Congress
intended.
(3) Each shipment upon which a concession is given consti-
tutes a separate offense .2
(4) The number of penalties should be limited to the number
of bills presented by the carrier and paid by the shipper, the
offense being complete when the money is paid.17 This third view
would, to the writer's mind, be the correct one where the offense
charged was merely soliciting or agreeing to accept a rebate or
concession, but in the Standard Oil cases the indictment charged
not an agreement to accept, but an actual acceptance of a rebate,
and, as the Circuit Court of Appeals points out,'8 until the
transaction has been consummated by the payment by the shipper
of the less rate, or the receipt of the shipper from the carrier of a
* rebate on the full rate, there is no completed offense. Accord-
ingly it would seem that the fourth view is correct, viz.: that
the number of payments would indicate the number of offenses.
It might be argued that we have arrived at the same situation as
objection was made to above-the carrier could arrange for very
few payments at very long intervals. But from a practical stand-
point this is not probable, and if it was, there is no necessity for
indicting for the completed offense, when the Act makes the
soliciting or agreeing to accept a rebate or concession equally an
offense.
15 164 Fed., 376, 386.
16 Hazel, D. J., 158 Fed., 536, 538.
17Contention of defendant, i55 Fed., 305, 313, decision of Circuit
Court of Appeals, 164 Fed., 376, 385, 386.
18 r64 Fed., 376, 386.
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Outside of the Standard Oil cases, there are a number of inter-
esting decisions on the Anti-Rebate Act, particularly two by
Judge Hough in the Southern District of Nev York; made prior
to the Circuit Court of Appeals decision. In U. S. v. Great
Northern R. Co., ' and U. S. v. Central Vt. Ry.,
20 the learned
Judge took the view that a rebate is not given until the amount
thereof is paid--"if a man agrees to give another an unlawful
pecuniary advantage, something not enforceable at law at all, it
appears to me plain that the person to whom the promise is made
has gotten nothing whatever until he has received and pocketed
the pecuniary fruits of such illegal arrangement." "If . . . the
payment and acceptance of the rebate be the substantial offense
here charged, then I think each substantial payment is properly
the subject of separate indictment or count, just as truly as each
separate and distinct visit of a burglar to a chest he slowly rifles
of a set of silverware constitutes a separate offense, although it
was his original intention to take the entire set sooner or later."
Two successive cases in 165 Fed. Rep. are to the same effect:
U. S. v. Stearns Co.,
21 and U. S. v. Bunch, 22 and they are inter-
esting as throwing some light on the question as to what-would
be the rule in case the indictment charged merely an offering or
soliciting of a concession or rebate. Judge Knappen, in the first
named case, thought that the Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
"apparently favors the proposition that even in such case the
offense is not committed until the payment and receipt 
of the
rebates"; and a careful reading of Judge Grosscup's opinion and
of Judge Baker's concurring opinion does seem *to indicate,
by way of dicta, that payment and receipt are necessary in every
case. If that was meant, said Judge Trieber in U. S. v. Bunch,
such an interpretation violates the maxim that "all the words of a
law must have effect rather than part should perish by construc-
tion," and he quotes authorities which, to the writer's mind, point
strongly to the fact that payment would not be necessary in case
only an offer or solicitation were charged in 
the indictment.
23
There is little to indicate what view the Supreme Court of the
United States will take as to the unit of offense in these rebate
cases. They have said, with respect to the right to prosecute in
29 157 Fed., 288.
20 187 Fed., 291.
21 165 Fed., 735.
22 i65 Fed., 736.
23 See Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S.,.56, 73, 74.
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each of the districts through which goods are transported at an
illegal rate, that such a transportation is a single offense, although
it is continuously committed in each district in which the transpor-
tation is received at the prohibited rate.24 But aside from this
statement, the Court has not been called upon as yet to pass on
this phase of the rebate law, nor has it indicated otherwise what
its decision will be.
A third class of cases of much importance at the time, but now
chiefly of historical interest, arose under the Anti-Polygamy Act
of 1882,2' which provided that "if any male person ... cohabits
with more than one woman, he shall be deemed guilty of mis-
demeanor." In the case of In re S1o1W, 26 the defendant was con-
victed of three separate offenses under this statute by reason of co-
habitation during a certain period with seven women as his wives.
The Supreme Court held that there was but one offense, that "it
was the mere will of the grand jury" that stopped with three
offenses rather than thirty-five, or more, that this was one of the
class of offenses that were continuous in character and not of the
class that can be committed uno ictu.
The inherent difficulty in all these cases arises from the fact that
it is quite impossible to determine whether Congress is laying
more emphasis on a guilty state of mind-the mens rea of the
criminal law-or on the overt act resulting from that state of
mind. Of course, every real crime contains both elements, and if
either element is missing there is no crime. What is one act is
perhaps a simple enough thing to determine, but what is one state
of mind is not so simple. If the A railroad, in accordance with
-a previous agremeent with the B company, knowingly transports
one car of coal each day during the month of May at a rate for-
bidden by law, has the A railroad committed thirty offenses, or
one offense, or some intermediate number? The A railroad may
argue that it formed the intention to give this concession to the
B company on the last day of April preceding, and never varied
from that intention during the whole of May, nor formed any
new intention-in other words, that there was only one state of
mind during all that period, and when punished once, there can
be no second punishment. The prosecution, on the other hand,
may take the view that every time a car is shipped, there is a
24 Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S., 56, 77.
25 22 Stat. at L. 31.
26 120 U. S. 274.
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new state of mind, a new mens rea, and therefore there were
thirty acts accompanied by thirty punishable states of mind, and
so thirty crimes.
If the law should disregard the state of mind, there would be
no question but that every act was a separate offense-thus, if I
drive my automobile at an illegal rate of speed on thirty consecu-
tive days, I certainly would commit at least thirty distinct offenses.
But this would be a case of that class where the law regards
presence or absence of intent as immaterial-offenses which an
eminent teacher is accustomed to term to his classes "public
torts," i. e., acts where the gist of the liability is the damage done
to the public and not the wrongful state of mind of the doer.
However, intent must be taken into account in the classes of cases
we have been discussing, because they are true crimes; and unless
Congress more specifically declares what shall constitute one
entire and completed crime in offenses, particularly in offenses
concerned with interstate commerce, the Courts will probably be
called on for repeated constructions that a little care in drafting
would have made unnecessary.
While the question of the unit of offense seems only to have
arisen under these three or four statutes, there is no reason why it
may not come up under a number of other Federal statutes.
Thus under the Animal Quarantine Act,2 7 the penal section (sec.
6) merely provides that "any person, company, or corporation
violating the provisions of section two or four" shall be punished,
without any statement as to whether the unit is one cow, one ship-
ment, one train, one boat load, etc.; the Pure Food and Drugs
Act"8 provides against the adulteration of "any article of food or
drugs," and it might be contended that because it speaks of
"original packages" an original package is the unit; however,
section ten speaks of "any article . . . in originai tinbroken
packages," which seems to point to an entire shipment as included
in "any article"; the Eight-Hour Law , might be construed to
make the employer liable for one offense for each and every
employee working over eight hours, or only for one offense for all
his employees working over-time on one separate day.
It is needless to multiply further such examples. These
statutes affect interests of such importance that it is known before
2733 St. L. 1264.
2 34 St. L. 768.
29 27 St. L. 340.
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they are enacted that every doubtful word or phrase will be sub-
ject to question and argument, and it is confidently believed that
if the unit of offense were defined with precision and certainty
much of the difficulty of their enforcement would disappear.
F. Granville Munson.
New York City.
